Whereas some researchers emphasize
dependent variable measures whether a dispute is resolved during the consultation phase, 84 whether it ends in compliance after a panel or appellate body ruling, or whether it further 85 escalates into a dispute about compliance with the WTO verdict. 86 Secondly, measuring domestic political stakes and the complexity of disputes requires a 87 systematic classification of disputes according to these theoretical constructs. We characterize The third innovation in our article is that we take into account governments' forward-95 looking behavior and design our empirical testing strategy accordingly. Kaunitz (2008) include a full classification of sectors, but only look at dispute initiation (rather than escalation), and they focus on developing countries only. Guzman and Simmons (2002) code disputes according to their 'all or nothing' character. They argue that disputes of this type are more likely to escalate to the panel stage (escalation is coded as a two-step process) because it is more difficult to arrange gradual concessions and transfer payments in such cases. This argument implies that, for example, disputes about tariff levels are easier to settle than disputes about environment, health and safety regulations. 11 Signorino 1999 . 12 derive from the enforcement and managerial perspectives, distinguish between two scenarios. 139 First, we discuss how both domestic political stakes and complexity affect dispute escalation 140 when governments behave non-strategically. Secondly, we relax this assumption and argue 141 how the dynamics of dispute escalation should look when governments behave strategically; 142 that is, when they are forward looking in the sense that they take their opponents' possible 143 future actions into account. 13 The parties to a dispute are allotted a period of sixty days for consultations and mediation. If they fail to reach an agreement, the plaintiff can ask for a dispute settlement panel to be established. This panel, which consists of several international trade experts, must be set up within forty-five days and has six month to issue its report. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has to adopt the report within sixty days and can reject it only by consensus. The entire process takes up to one year, and approximately another three to four months if an appeal is brought before the WTO's appellate body. After the adoption of the report, the defendant country is given a 'reasonable' period of time to implement the panel's recommendations. If the defendant does not comply with the ruling, the complainant can ask the DSB to permit retaliatory measures, for example tariffs on imports from the defendant country. As of September 2011, more than 420 dispute settlement cases had entered the WTO system, many of which have been resolved.
14 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm. 15 Bechtel and Sattler 2012.
SAT TLE R, SPIL KER AND BE RNAUE R
According to the enforcement perspective, many international co-operative efforts have 146 the structure of mixed-motive games. 16 26 This should be true for the defendant and the complainant country alike. The complainant country should opt for early settlement during the consultation stage in order to obtain any concessions by the defendant country. This is because the complainant anticipates that the defendant country is unlikely to make concessions once a panel ruling has been issued due to the high domestic political stakes of the dispute. Similarly, the defendant country should opt for early settlement to avoid economic and/or reputational costs associated with an ongoing WTO dispute. This is because the defendant anticipates that it will become hard to appease the respective sector once a panel ruling has been issued. 27 when parties have conflicting and high expectations that they will win the case. As illustrated by the US-Japan apples case, WTO dispute settlement serves primarily to 28 of the probability that an actor will make a particular choice at the outset and during 374 the bargaining process. 35 We develop a strategic model that reflects the essential steps in 375 the WTO DSM. Based on this model, we can deduce the likelihood that the complainant 376 and the defendant will take specific actions during the WTO dispute settlement process.
377
The empirical model is then estimated using statistical backwards induction. 37 The WTO's DSM includes more steps, but these are mostly procedural and of minor importance for our analysis. For instance, the parties can appeal against the panel report, which leads to a review of the case by the appellate body, which then submits a report. To keep the model tractable, we do not include these additional steps, but consider the final decisions on each stage as the relevant outcomes. At the panel stage, this is the final report, whether the report is issued by a panel or the appellate body. 38 In our representation of the WTO's DSM, we do not consider the panel as a third player, but treat its rulings as exogenous. Accounting explicitly for the panel decision (or even endogenizing its ruling) would make the model highly complex, with serious complications for the model estimation. Making the panel ruling endogenous would, in fact, imply that the panel behaves strategically and is therefore, in some way, politically motivated. For example, one could envisage the panel, taking into account power differences by ruling in favor of more powerful countries in disputes. At the same time, however, it is also possible to think of the panel trying to help countries with a lower legal capacity to counterbalance their potential disadvantage in the dispute process. Due to this theoretical ambiguity, and to keep the model as simple as possible, we decided to treat the panel as a technical and neutral body in the dispute settlement process. 405 The 
413
We use quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to derive the outcome probabilities. 
UTILITIES, VARIABLES AND DATA

421
We use several explanatory and control variables to measure governments' utilities.
422
The political stakes reflect the audience costs that governments face at the domestic level. dumping, subsidies or various other instruments -in contrast to tariffs and quotas, which 39 Signorino 1999. In particular, QRE is based on the assumption that a player may not entirely know his utility at a later decision node. This is plausible when the second move by the same player takes place in the future . This is generally the case in WTO dispute settlement, because it often takes quite some time to move from the consultation stage all the way to an implementation dispute. Moreover, the government can change within this period, which means that different actors take the decisions at different nodes. We leave the comparison of the QRE results with estimations based on Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for future research. 40 
485 486 Furthermore, more complex cases end more often with non-compliance (thirty-eight cases) 550 and implementation disputes (twenty-four cases) than with compliance (thirty-seven cases) 551 or backing-down by the complainant (fourteen cases). 48 Disputes with lower domestic 47 Technically, the manufacturing sector variable does not explicitly appear in the complainant's utility for consultation U C (Y 1 ), but indirectly through the backwards induction process. Through backwards induction, all variables associated with the first stage are multiplied by the likelihood of facing an implementation dispute (p 2 * p 3 ), as specified at the end of the last section. 48 To measure compliance, most existing studies on the implementation of GATT/WTO verdicts rely on the coding of Hudec (1993) , which consists of three categories: whether the defendant liberalized the contested policy fully, partly or not at all. This measure does not capture whether the contested policy was changed as requested in a particular panel ruling, which is what we are interested in. To measure compliance, we first identified the cases in which a panel or the appellate body issued a ruling against the defendant. 49 Table 3 presents the summary statistics.
557
RESULTS
558
The interpretation of the results from the strategic model is more complicated than in compliance with WTO law during the specified time period. In eleven of the cases, we were not able to obtain information on compliance. We exclude these cases from our analysis at the second and last stages. 49 Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2008. In particular, we use data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) for Hong Kong, which is not included in Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2008. Values for the EU are the sum of the values for the individual EU member states. For total EU exports and imports, we subtract intra-EU trade because, considering the EU as a single market and single actor in WTO disputes, we are interested in its dependence on trade with non-EU countries. Data on intra-EU trade is from the IMF DOTS. 50 In Signorino and Tarar's (2006) words, 'in the deterrence model, relevant variables can affect the attacker's behavior in two ways: directly through its utilities for the various outcomes and indirectly through its belief p d about whether the defender will defend' (595). In our context, the attacker is equivalent to the complainant, the defense is equivalent to non-compliance by the defendant and p d is the probability that is called p 2 in our model. defendant when a high-stakes sector is concerned. But at the same time, it can also have a 569 negative indirect effect if the complainant dislikes further escalation later on, and high political 570 stakes increase the probability of escalation at the second and third stages of the DSM.
571
In view of these possibilities, we proceed in two steps. First, we discuss the estimated Table 4 presents the estimation results for our strategic WTO dispute settlement model. Standard errors in parentheses. Errors cluster on related disputes ***p , 0.05, ***p , 0.01 51 The statistical significance of the joint hypothesis tests is lower for the stage regressions in the first and second columns because the number of observations decreases with every additional stage in the DSM. To ensure consistency between the structural empirical model and theory, we prefer not to exclude 589 The coefficients on the explanatory variables indicate their direct effect on actors' utilities. 590 As we can infer from the last column, the variable measuring lower domestic political stakes 591 has a negative direct effect on the complainant's utility from requesting a panel ruling. 592 Similarly, the second column shows that lower political stakes decrease the defendant's utility variables from a particular stage regression simply because they are not statistically significant and therefore reduce the significance of the joint hypothesis tests. What matters for our analysis is the implications of all three stage regressions for dispute resolution dynamics as represented by the predicted probabilities in Figures 2 and 3 . 52 Following the procedure by Bas, Signorino, and Walker (2008, 28) , the constant in the equation representing the complainant's utility of a panel ruling (last column) is weighted by the product of the probability of non-compliance and the probability of an implementation dispute, p 2 * p 3 . A negative coefficient on the constant in the last column therefore indicates that the utility of a panel ruling decreases when the probability of non-compliance (p 2 ) and/or the probability of an implementation dispute (p 3 ) increases. The constant in the equation representing the defendant's utility of non-compliance is weighted by the probability of an implementation dispute, p 3 . A negative coefficient on this variable therefore indicates that the utility of non-compliance decreases when the probability of an implementation dispute increases.
suggests the opposite (that is, that greater complexity should increase the complainant's utility where p 1 through p 3 are the probabilities in Figure 1 . 53 We compute these probabilities forward-looking component is small, we should see only small differences between the 53 These probabilities can be estimated using the estimation results in Table 4 for different values of the independent variables, for example for low political stakes (manufacturing) 5 1 and low political stakes 5 0 and for complexity 5 0 and complexity 5 1. All other variables are set to their median values.
probabilities for strategic and naive governments. Secondly, the simulation allows us to we compute and plot the conditional probability for compliance (Y 2 
